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Resumo 
Este artigo compara eficiências custo de empresas publicas e privadas brasileiras de oferta de água. Para 
mensurar a eficiência faz-se uso de um modelo de fronteira estocástica definido por meio de uma função 
custo na família Cobb-Douglas. A especificação da fronteira inclui efeitos técnicos. Estima-se o modelo 
pelo método de máxima verossimilhança para um painel de firmas brasileiras observadas no período 2002-
2004. Os resultados estatísticos indicam evidência de que as firmas públicas são mais eficientes, embora 
a diferença em eficiência esteja declinando no período analisado. De um modo geral, o sistema de oferta 
de água e saneamento está se tornando mais eficiente ao longo do tempo. 
PalavRas-Chave
oferta de água, fronteira estocástica, eficiência de custo, dados de painel 
abstRaCt
This paper compares cost efficiencies of Brazilian public and private companies of water supply. To mea-
sure efficiency a Cobb-Douglas stochastic cost frontier model including technical effects is estimated by 
maximum likelihood to a panel of Brazilian firms for the period 2002 - 2004. The statistical results indicate 
that there is evidence that public firms are more efficient although the difference in efficiency is declining 
over time. Overall the system of water and sewerage supply is becoming more efficient over time.
KeywoRds
water supply, stochastic frontier, cost efficiency, panel data 
Jel ClassifiCation
R15, R38
 Embrapa. Endereço para contato: Embrapa – Diretoria Executiva, Secretaria de Administração Estratégica. Parque Es-
tação Biológica, Final Av. W3 Norte, Asa Norte, CEP: 70.770-901. Brasília – DF. E-mail: geraldo.souza@embrapa.br.
  Universidade Católica de Brasília. Endereço para contato: Universidade Católica de Brasília, Campus II, SGAN 916 
Norte, Av. W5, CEP-70.790-160, Brasília-DF. E-mail: ricardoc@ucb.br..
 Universidade Católica de Brasília. Endereço para contato: Universidade Católica de Brasília, Campus II, SGAN 916 
Norte, Av. W5, CEP-70.790-160, Brasília-DF. E-mail: tito@pos.ucb.br.
(Recebido em  julho de 2006. Aceito para publicação em agosto de 2007).
Est. econ., são Paulo, 38(4): 905-917, out-dez 2008
906 Efficiency of Brazilian Public and Private Water utilities
1 IntRoDuctIon 
Despite the effort of the Brazilian government in improving the water and sewerage 
services in the last years, the services have not been entirely satisfactory and some 
problems persists, such as low indices of coverage, high indices of loss of water and 
minor availability of public resources for investments. In this context, the privati-
zation of the sector appears as a possible way to improve the performance of the 
sector. However, the privatization process is being implemented in the absence of 
well defined regulatory policies. Given this condition, the increase in efficiency with 
the participation of the private sector is questionable (See Tupper and reSenDe, 
2004).
The efficiency of public and private companies in the water industry has been object 
of study in the literature, especially in the u.S.A., u.K., and some Asian countries1 
The literature is controversial with no clear indication on what type of company 
performs better.
Dealing specifically with Brazil, Faria, Souza and Moreira (2005) fit a stochastic 
production frontier model for the 2002 to compare technical efficiencies of public 
and private water supply companies. They show that private companies are only mar-
ginally more efficient than public companies. Faria, Souza and Moreira (2005), also 
for 2002, use a stochastic cost frontier model to conclude that there is not evidence 
that private firms and public firms are significantly different in terms of efficiency 
measurements. 
This article contributes to the literature on the efficiency of public and private water 
and sewerage supply companies in Brazil assessing efficiency in a context defined by 
a panel of firms operating at a county level. The period of concern is 2002-2004. 
previous studies are restricted to cross-sectional studies at a given year and at the 
state level. 
The article is composed of six sections including the introduction. Section 2 des-
cribes the process of privatization of the water and sewerage industry in Brazil. 
Sections 3 presents a brief review on the literature comparing efficiencies of public 
and private companies in the water and sewerage industry. In Section 4 we deal 
with methodological aspects and set forth the stochastic frontier model used in the 
1 See Morgan (1997); Crain and Zardkoohi (1978); Bruggink (1982); Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983); 
Fox and Hofler (1986); Byrnes, Grosskopf and Hayes (1986); Teeples and Glyer (1987); Byrnes 
(1991); raffiee et al. (1993); Bhattacharyya, parker and raffiee (1994); Bhattacharyya et al. (1995a); 
Bhattacharyya et al. (1995b); Shaoul (1997); Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998); Ashton (2000); Saal and 
parker (2000); Saal and parker (2001); estache and rossi (2002); Saal, parker and Weyman-Jones 
(2004); Saal and parker (2005).
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article. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, in Section 6, we summarize 
the statistical findings and present the main conclusions of the article. 
2  asPEcts oF thE PRIvatIZatIon oF BRaZIlIan WatER utIlItIEs
The privatization in Brazil initiated in the 90’s, after the creation of the national 
program of privatization (pnD) by the federal government, under the coordination 
of BnDeS (Brazilian Development Bank). The water and sanitation services, owned 
by local counties and states, are still being, slowly, incorporated to the privatization 
process by means of concessions and sales of stockholding participation. The current 
Constitution of the Federative republic of Brazil establishes that the three spheres 
of government (union, States and Local Counties) must act to promote and to 
guarantee the water and sanitation services. However, this constitution does not de-
fine the specific functions of each member of the federation. In the face of it, some 
impasses appear. For example, the ownership of the water and sanitation services 
is not yet well defined by the current legislation and has been widely discussed by 
sector’s specialists.
Although the participation of the private sector has increased in the last years, the 
larger water and sanitation companies - CeSBs (Basic Sanitation State Companies), 
created in the 70’s, still are the main agents of the sewerage and water services in the 
country. The participation of the private sector has occurred mainly in some isolated 
counties. The first concessions appeared in the middle of the 90’s and since then, 
they have increased (Moreira, 1998). According to ABCOn (Associação Brasileira 
das Concessionárias privadas de Serviços públicos em Água e esgoto), there are 41 
private concessions in Brazil supplying sewerage and water services to 50 counties in 
the States of São paulo, rio de Janeiro, espírito Santo, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso 
do Sul, Minas Gerais, paraná, pará and Amazonas. 
According to Spiller and Savedoff (1999), many of the contracts of public-private 
partnership have not produced good results in developing countries, especially in 
Latin America. The experiences in these countries indicate that the lack of clear rules 
on the tariff readjustments results in an unsustainable system. Also the lack of credi-
bility of the governments may lead the public to view the privatization process as a 
result of favoritism, resulting in a solution of high political cost. Brazil, in particular, 
has not had experiences very different from other Latin American countries.
In Brazil the institutional support of privatization is provided by the program 
prOper (program for the promotion of the public/private partnership for 
Sewerage Services and Water Supply), financed by BnDeS. This program stimula-
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tes the private participation in the water and sewerage sector, provides institutional 
support and finances contracts of specialized consultants in the elaboration of pro-
jects of privatization in the states and counties. In the federal sphere, institutional 
support is being offered by the national Office of environmental Sanitation (SnSA) 
by means of the program for the Modernization of the Sanitation Sector - pMSS 
(pArLATOre, 2000).
Although the institutional supports are important, they do not guarantee a process 
of adequate privatization. For more than a decade it has been discussed in Brazil the 
necessity to implement certain legal and institutional instruments with the purpose 
of consolidating a new model of management compatible with the realities of the 
sector (SILvA, 1995; eMerCIAnO and BALTAr, 1995; pereIrA, BALTAr 
and ABICALLI, 1995; reZenDe, 1995; FArIA and FArIA, 2004). recently 
Brazil approved a Federal Law (Lei 1.445/2007) which now regulates the sector. 
Although much early to assess the impact of this law it is generally expected that it 
will be an incentive to increase the participation of the private sector in the sewe-
rage and water supply services. We see that further institutional improvements are 
necessary as the creation of a regulatory agency. 
Accordingly to Tupper and resende (2004) the tariff policy for the sector follows 
a regulation model for the rate of return. In this context, the increase in efficiency, 
with the participation of the private sector, is questionable. Following the regula-
tion theory of incentives of Laffont and Tirole (1993), without adequate incentives, 
which is the case of the regulation of the rate of return, a firm may maximize its 
profits without being efficient. 
3  a BRIEF lItERatuRE REvIEW 
Many studies have evaluated the increase in efficiency caused by the private parti-
cipation in the water and sewerage industry, mainly in the united States and uK. 
Crain and Zardkoohi (1978) investigate economic efficiency in public and private 
companies using data on water utilities in the united States. They use a cross-sec-
tional sample consisting of 112 firms, 24 being private, and 88 being public, from 
38 states in 1970 and estimated a cost function. The results show that operating 
costs are significantly higher in water utilities that are publicly owned. Furthermore, 
they show that lower productivity per unit of labor input in the public firms would 
imply that relatively more employees would be required for any given expansion of 
output than in comparable private firms. 
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Feigenbaumand and Teeples (1983) compare estimates from a hedonic cost func-
tion with estimates derived from a non-hedonic production specification. Despite 
differences in production technology of water operations, both the hedonic and 
non-hedonic models suggest that there is no difference in cost-of-service equations 
for government versus private companies. They use data for 1970, including 57 uS 
private and 262 uS public water companies. 
Byrnes, Grosskopf and Hayes (1986) avoid the cost function approach and focus on 
the measurements of technical and scale efficiencies relative to a production techno-
logy by means of programming techniques. They find no significant difference in 
efficiency across ownership types. Their sample comprises 68 government owned 
and 59 privately owned water utilities operating in the uS in 1976. Likewise, Fox 
and Hofler (1986) concludes that, in terms of aggregate cost, no statistical diffe-
rence can be found between technical efficiency estimates for public and private 
firms, although allocative efficiency differences were observed. The authors use uS 
cross-section data for 1981 with a sample of 156 publicly and 20 privately owned 
utilities. 
Bhattacharyya, parker and raffiee (1994) presents empirical evidence on the issue of 
efficiency of the private/public sector examining costs of 225 public and 32 private 
uS water utilities using the data from a 1992 survey in the water industry. The sta-
tistical findings provide evidence that public water utilities are more efficient than 
private utilities on average, but are more widely dispersed between best and worst 
practices. 
Saal and parker (2001) evaluate the productivity and price performance for the 
privatized water and sewage service companies of england and Wales. estimates 
of productivity growth, derived with quality adjusted output indices, suggest that 
despite reductions in labor usage, total factor productivity growth has not improved 
since privatization in 1989. Furthermore, total price performance indices reveal that 
increases in output price have outstripped increases in input costs, a trend which 
is largely responsible for the increase in economic profits that has occurred since 
privatization. They use non-parametric methods to determine labor and total factor 
productivity growth rates for both the 1985-1990 pre-privatization period and the 
1990-1999 post-privatization years. 
results from Saal and parker (2000, 2001) and Saal, parker and Weyman-Jones 
(2004) suggest that privatization without regulation leads to no improvements in 
performance of the water utilities sector. 
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The article of estache and rossi (2002) provides further evidence on the difference 
between public and private utilities estimating a stochastic cost frontier for a sample 
of Asian and pacific regional water companies. The results indicate that efficiency 
is not significantly different between private and public utilities. The sample covers 
50 firms surveyed in 1995 in 19 countries. 
The Argentine national Government (over half of its provinces) initiated major re-
forms of its water and sanitation services during the 1990’s. In this context, estache 
and Trujillo (2003) show that it is possible to derive an upper bound for the esti-
mates of technical efficiency gains achieved by the operators of various water com-
panies in Argentina. For the two provinces for which data were available, the gains 
in efficiency are roughly 2% per year. The authors argue that if these gains can be 
sustained, they represent quite significant contributions from the reforms of the 
sector in these provinces. 
4  thE thEoREtIcal cost FunctIon
As in Faria, Souza and Moreira (2005) and Souza, Faria and Moreira (2007), our 
choice of statistical model is a stochastic frontier in the translog family. Within this 
family we chose the Cobb-Douglas formulation2 since the results of the estimation 
process were more consistent with economic theory. Our formulation differs from 
previous work since it includes a time dependency on the inefficiency component. 
Imposing linear homogeneity our statistical model takes the form 
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where 0 < d < 1, b > 0, and itC , itlp , 
it
kp , and ity , denote, respectively, the total 
cost , the price of labor (r$/year), the price of capital (r$/km of water network 
extension) and the level of output for firm i in period t. The price of capital was 
computed using the identity 
it it
it l it
k
it
C p lp
k
−=  as in Souza, Faria and Moreira (2007). 
As a proxy for capital we use the quantity, in Km, corresponding to the length of 
the piped water network for firm i. Labor is measured by the number of employees 
at the last day of the year.
2 The fit of a full translog cost function, although significant, showed estimates for which we were not 
able to prove some basic properties of the cost function like monotonicity and concavity. 
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The quantities a0, d and b are unknown parameters, the n it  form a random 
sample from the N(0, s2) for each t and are independent over time. The itu  
are inefficiency components, independent from the itv , representing indepen-
dent observations from the 2( , )it uN
+ m s . The variances s2 and 
2
us are both unk-
nown. Here
 0 1 1 2 2 3 2 4 2 5 3 6 4 7 5 8 6cov covit it it it it it it it itd d d d d d= + + + + + + + +m d d d d d d d d d  
were the technical effects, Cov1 ( population density), Cov2 (% of water treated), 
1d  (indicator for private firms), 2d , 3d  (indicators of the regions, southeast and 
south, respectively),3 4d (indicator for state firms),4 5d and 6d (time dummies for 
2003 and 2004, respectively) are assumed to linearly affect the mean m it. The for-
mulation of the stochastic frontier model just introduced is flexible in regard to the 
use of the truncated normal as an inefficiency distribution. See Khumbhakar and 
Lovell (2000). Lack of enough observations in time precludes the use of more com-
plex models to describe time dependence. 
The inefficiency of firm i  in period t is computed as (exp( ) | )it itE u v . The mo-
del is to be estimated by maximum likelihood methods. As in Coelli, rao 
and Battese (1998) we carry out the estimation process using the paramete-
rization 2 2 2( )u u= +g s s s . Imposing g = 0 implies a non stochastic frontier, 
that is, a standard regression model. 
5 Data analysIs 
The data we use to estimate the stochastic cost frontier model described in Section 4 
was obtained from the Brazilian (national) System for Information about Sanitation 
– SnIS and cover the period 2002-2004. The utility companies in the sample supply 
water and sewerage services for 133.8 million inhabitants, corresponding to more 
than 70% of the Brazil’s population. The sample comprises 342 firms of which 324 
are public and 18 private. Hence, there are 1026 observations.
3 The regions north and northeast were not included because there are not private companies in these 
regions. The parameters 2d and 3d measure differences relative to the center-west region. 
4  14 =d for a state company, other wise 04 =d .
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The Cobb-Douglas cost frontier including technical effects described in Section 4 
was estimated using the software Frontier 4.1 (COeLLI; rAO; BATTeSe, 1998). 
The results are reported in Table 1. 
taBlE 1 - MaxIMuM lIkElIhooD EstIMatIon oF thE cost FRon-
tIER
Variables Parameter Estimative
Standard 
Deviation
t statistic
Equation of Frontier
Constant a0 -2.432 0.178 -13.626
Capital Price d 0.449 0.016 27.604
Product b 0.863 0.012 73.770
Technical Effects 
Constant d0 1.011 0.239 4.234
d1(Type of firm) d1 0.196 0.075 2.613
d2(Southeast region) d2 -0.128 0.057 -2.259
d3(South region) d3 0.385 0.063 6.129
d4(State firms) d4 -0.326 0.042 -7.744
Cov1(density) d5 -0.314 0.079 -3.956
Cov2 (water treatment) d6 0.142 0.036 3.938
d5 (Time_1) d7 0.213 0.037 5.807
d6 (Time_2) d8 0.009 0.036 0.236
Sigma-square s2 0.223 0.009 22.760
Gamma g 0.0004 0.008 -
LR one sided test (10df) 292.8
Number of restrictions 13
N 1026
Table 1 shows the significance of all parameters in the Cobb-Douglas cost function 
(a0, d and b) with the respective (expected) signs. elasticities estimates all fall in ex-
pected ranges. We observe that technical effects are significant with the exception of 
d6 (Time_2). The main technical effect of concern in this article is d1 (d1), a dummy 
variable indicating whether or not a company belongs to the private sector. As one 
can see in Table 1 there is evidence leading to the conclusion that the private sector 
is less efficient than the public sector. The regional dummies d2 and d3, which are 
measured relative to the Center-West region of Brazil, show opposite signs. This me-
ans that the Southeast region is more efficient and the south is less efficient than the 
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Center-West region. The state firms (d4) are less inefficient than county firms. The 
population density (Cov1) has a negative sign, i.e., higher values of population densi-
ty imply more efficiency (lower cost of distribution). The positive sign of Cov2 is an 
indication of higher inefficiency due to higher costs of water treatment. efficiency 
changes trough time. The Inefficiency time effect fell in 2003 relative to 2002 (d5: 
Time _1>0) and recovered to the 2002 pattern in 2004 (d6: Time_2=0). 
We note that the one-sided likelihood ratio test statistic of the hypothesis g = 0 is 
Lr = 292.8, highly significant, favoring the stochastic frontier model. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the inefficiency scores by year and type of 
firm. One can see that the mean inefficiencies estimated for the private and public 
sectors differ significantly for all years. Furthermore, the difference between the 
means of public and private sectors is declining, from 0.704 in 2002 to 0.608 and 
0.518 in 2003 and 2004 respectively. Although, the empirical findings indicate that 
the public sector is more efficient than the private sector, the inefficiency gap be-
tween the sectors is declining over the period. Overall inefficiency is also decreasing 
over time. The mean inefficiency values for 2002-2004 are 2.106, 1.721, and 1.697, 
respectively. The values for 2003 and 2004 are not statistically significant. 
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taBlE 2 - DEscRIPtIvE statIstIcs: InEFFIcIEncy scoREs By yEaR 
anD tyPE oF FIRM 
Type of Year
Statistics Firm  2002 2003 2004
Mean Public 2.069 1.689 1.670
Private 2.773 2.297 2.186
Standard Deviation Public 0.569 0.462 0.455
Private 0.648 0.569 0.567
N Public 324 324 324
Private 18 18 18
t statistics (**)
(p-value)
5.077
(<0.001)
5.367
(<0.001)
4.618
(<0.001)
Difference of means 0.704 0.608 0.518
6  conclusIons 
This article studies the efficiency effect of private firms in the urban water industry 
in Brazil considering a panel of firms over the period 2002-2004. In this context a 
stochastic cost frontier including technical effects. Statistical inference leads to the 
conclusion that there is evidence that public firms are more efficient although diffe-
rences are declining over time. Overall efficiency levels seem to be increasing though 
time. The results are robust to the choice of functional forms in the sense that the 
translog and the Cobb-Douglas specifications lead to the same results. 
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